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COMMENT
ESTABLISHING A PATTERN: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
SUPREME COURTS ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads in part, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1
These two phrases are known as the Establishment Clause and
the Free Exercise Clause, respectively, and each plays a distinct
part in determining the role and status of religion in American
society. The Free Exercise Clause guarantees freedom of reli-
gious expression to the individual, while the Establishment
Clause prohibits the government from involving itself in reli-
gious affairs and prevents religious officials from exerting im-
proper influence over the government.
The extent to which the Establishment Clause applies to
certain situations has been a great source of conflict in the
United States. It seems that each individual has his own idea
of what is proper in the realm of separation of church and
state. This is true for individuals who bring suit for violations
of the Establishment Clause and even more so for the justices
of the Supreme Court of the United States who construe the
clause itself. The Establishment Clause has been greatly litigat-
ed, with more than seventy cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court since the 1940s, yet the Court has been unable
to agree for any amount of time on a standard method for de-
termining if the Establishment Clause has been violated.
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
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This article explores the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court, focusing mainly on cases involving public
schools and public religious displays. Part I of the article sum-
marizes methods employed by the Court in determining wheth-
er or not there was a violation of the Establishment Clause
prior to 1971 and documents the formation of the Lemon test2
as a means for assessing violations by looking at the cases
which have applied the test and the results the Court has
reached using the test. Part II explains the Court's adoption
and ultimate rejection of the Lemon test as unworkable.
Part III of the article focuses on the individual justices cur-
rently sitting on the Supreme Court. It analyzes the major tests
that have developed since Lemon, either as replacements or
supplements to that test. Also, it examines the elements of
those tests, the cases in which they have been applied, and the
justices who choose to apply them. This section begins with
Justice O'Connor's announcement of her endorsement test and
Justice Stevens's agreement with and application of her en-
dorsement principles. Next it looks at Justice Souter's partial
adoption of O'Connor's endorsement test, coupled with his re-
quirement of absolute neutrality. The section then explores
Justice Kennedy's coercion test and Justice Scalia's strict ver-
sion of a coercion test and his adoption of a per se rule to be
used in public forum cases. This section also documents Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinions, his failure to adopt any particular
formula for finding violations, and his voting pattern. Finally,
this section touches on the opinions of Justices Thomas, Breyer,
and Ginsburg and attempts to predict, based on cases in which
they have participated, how the newer justices will vote in
future cases implidating the Establishment Clause.
The article concludes with an analysis of what these tests
and patterns mean for the future of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, as well as a brief summary of how the Court is likely
to divide when future controversies arise.
2. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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I. HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
According to Thomas Jefferson, author of the First Amend-
ment, the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a "wall
of separation between church and state."3 This approach was
adopted by Justice Hugo Black in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion.4 Upholding New Jersey's practice of reimbursing parents
for bus transportation to private religious schools, Justice Black
wrote the following: "The First Amendment has erected a wall
between church and state. That wall must be kept high and
impregnable."5 The aid in question in this case went to stu-
dents attending public schools as well as to those attending pri-
vate religious schools, and served the secular purpose of pro-
moting the safety of children on their way to school.6
For a number of years, a majority of the Court backed this
separationist theory of the Establishment Clause and applied it
in several public school cases. The wall of separation metaphor,
however, was never fully formulated into a clear test. Thus, it
often produced unpredictable results.7 Using the wall metaphor,
the Supreme Court struck down an fllinois optional released
time program under which religion was taught in public
schools.' Four years later, the Court upheld a New York pro-
gram allowing students to leave school to obtain religious in-
struction off-campus.9 Finally, the Court struck down the use of
state composed, nondenominational prayers in public schools.1°
These decisions lacked uniformity because different justices
interpreting "the wall" had no single framework under which to
operate."
3. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (citation omitted).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. Id. at 18.
6. See id.
7. Compare McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (striking
down state aid to religion through religious education in public schools), and Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (striking down school prayer), with Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1952) (upholding state program aiding religion by
allowing students to leave school to attend religious instruction during the school
day).
8. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212.
9. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314-15.
10. See Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
11. See generally James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist
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In 1963, the Court adopted such a framework in Abington
Township School District v. Schempp.12 Justice Clark an-
nounced a two-part test which required that the government
action in question have both "a secular legislative purpose," and
"a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.""
This test provided the structure that was needed for analysis
under the Court's prevailing separationist view of the Establish-
ment Clause.
The Court added a third prong to this test in 1970, making it
even more difficult for government practices to survive scrutiny;
"excessive government entanglement" could also be considered
an establishment of religion. 4 A year later in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,5 Justice Burger, writing for the majority, an-
nounced a three-prong test for Establishment Clause cases. For
government action to be upheld, it must (1) have a secular pur-
pose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion, and (3) not involve an excessive entanglement
with religion." The so-called Lemon test has yet to be officially
overruled, but most members of the Court have abandoned it as
unworkable.
II. ADOPTION AND REJECTION OF THE LEMON TEST
A strict application of the Lemon test frequently leads to a
holding that the challenged government program violates the
Establishment Clause. Because of this hostility toward reli-
gion and the failure of many justices to apply the test even-
handedly, the Lemon test has been severely criticized and is no
longer favored by many members of the Court."8
of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as The Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 671, 672-673 (1990) (discussing the historical development of the Su-
preme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
12. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
13. Id. at 222.
14. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 667 (1970).
15. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
16. See id. at 612-13 (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)
and Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
17. See Timothy C. Caress, Note, Is Justice Kennedy the Supreme Court's Lone
Advocate for the Coercion Element in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence? An Analy-
sis of Lee v. Weisman, 27 IND. L. REV. 475, 478 (1993).
18. See id.
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This rejection of the Lemon test began only two years after
its announcement. In 1973, the Supreme Court, upholding state
aid to a Baptist college for use in nonsectarian projects, refused
to strictly apply the test because its guidelines were "no more
than helpful signposts."9 In 1983, the Court upheld prayer in
the Nebraska State Legislature without even applying the Lem-
on test.2 °
In 1984, the Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly2 signaled
the beginning of the end for the Lemon test. The Court was
deeply divided in this 5-4 decision, upholding a state-sponsored
Christmas display that included everything from Santa Claus
and reindeer to a creche.' Writing for the majority, Justice
Burger applied the Lemon test, but stated that the Court would
not be bound by its strict separationist views because the Con-
stitution does not require the "complete separation of church
and state."' In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor sug-
gested a "clarification" of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.' Justice O'Connor revised the purpose and ef-
fect prongs of the Lemon test, creating what has since become
known as the endorsement test.' The four dissenters also ap-
proved of Justice O'Connor's new test, making Lynch the first
case with a majority of the Court abandoning Lemon in favor of
a new standard.26
This trend continued with the Court's decision in Wallace v.
Jaffree,' striking down an Alabama statute providing for a
moment of silence for meditation or prayer in school. Writing
for the majority, Justice Stevens purported to apply the Lemon
test but substituted Justice O'Connor's endorsement test from
Lynch for the secular purpose prong of Lemon asking "whether
the government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion."' Justice O'Connor concurred with the judgment of
19. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
20. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
21. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
22. See id. at 671, 687.
23. Id. at 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-315 (1952) and
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1988)).
24. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 687-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
26. See id. at 696 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
28. Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
1999] 709
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the Court but wrote a separate opinion.' Dissenting, Chief
Justice Rehnquist suggested that the Lemon test be abandoned
entirely, even though he found no violation in this case.30 Once
again, a majority of the justices believed the Lemon test was
not the appropriate test for Establishment Clause analysis,
regardless of whether they found a violation.
III. ALTERNATIVE TESTS
If the Lemon test is no longer good law, what test should be
used to analyze Establishment Clause questions? The Supreme
Court was split in the mid-1980s when it announced the deci-
sions in Lynch and Wallace, and although the composition of
the Court has changed, the disagreement among its members
continues. Of the nine justices currently sitting on the Supreme
Court, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, Stevens, and Souter
have formulated distinct theories as to how these cases should
be analyzed. Some of these tests are similar, but due to funda-
mental disagreements, a stable consensus is unlikely to arise in
the near future.
A. Justice O'Connor's Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor has made substantial revisions to the Lem-
on test in formulating her endorsement test. She first articu-
lated this test in her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.3 Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor:
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from mak-
ing adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a
person's standing in the political community .... Endorse-
ment sends a message to nonadherents that they are out-
siders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message."
concurring)).
29. See id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 112-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
31. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
32. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Justice O'Connor's endorsement test stays within the frame-
work of Lemon while refocusing certain aspects of the inquiry.
Instead of asking what is the primary purpose of the govern-
ment action and whether the effects of the action advance or
inhibit religion, Justice O'Connor combines the two prongs into
one query: whether the government action has the effect of
"communicating a message of government endorsement or dis-
approval of religion."' Although it is proper to inquire into the
government's intent, it is only practices having the above effect
that are a violation. 4 Justice O'Connor explains that it is not
necessary to invalidate a "government practice merely because
it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or
inhibition of religion."35 In this way, Justice O'Connor's en-
dorsement test shifts the focus of the inquiry from the govern-
ment actions to the perceptions of the community. The third
prong of the Lemon test requires that there not be "excessive
entanglement" between church and state, and Justice O'Connor
has not changed that portion of the test.36
In her concurring opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice
O'Connor explained that her test was based on "whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history,
and implementation of the statute, would perceive [the govern-
ment practice] as a state endorsement" of religion.' Thus, the
test is based on an informed and reasonable observer's percep-
tion of the practice. Furthermore, the endorsement test may
require an analysis from the point of view of the reasonable
nonadherent because it inquires as to whether a message is
sent to nonadherents that they are "outsiders."38
As a result, the endorsement test could find Establishment
Clause violations where the Lemon test would not. The govern-
ment may pass a statute with a purpose other than the en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion, but if a reasonable observ-
33. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. See id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
37. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
38. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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er could mistakenly believe that endorsement or disapproval
was the purpose, the statute would violate Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test." Similarly, a statute may not endorse or
disapprove of religion in reality, but if a reasonable observer
could mistakenly believe that it affects the public's view, the
statute would also fail under the endorsement test.0
The endorsement test has been used by a majority of the
Court in a number of cases, beginning with Wallace v. Jaffree.
Using endorsement language, the majority in Wallace held
unconstitutional an Alabama statute that provided for a mo-
ment of silence for prayer or meditation.4' The majority relied
on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, and although she
did not join the majority, Justice O'Connor concurred in its
result, writing separately to clarify her test.42
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test was used again in
School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball' to decide the consti-
tutionality of public school teachers teaching remedial and en-
richment courses at parochial schools. Justice Brennan, writing
for the majority, focused on the effect of these programs.
Finding a violation of the Establishment Clause, he cited Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch.' According to Brennan,
the state action in this case was a "powerful symbol of state en-
dorsement and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in
the same class at some other time during the day."4 Ironical-
ly, Justice O'Connor did not join the majority opinion. She
wrote her own opinion again, concurring in part and dissenting
in part. In that opinion, she never referred to endorsement.'
In 1988, the endorsement test was again used in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.41 Writing for the plurality, Justice
Brennan found that Texas's practice of exempting religious peri-
39. See Elliot M. Berman, Endorsing the Supreme Court's Decision to Endorse En-
dorsement, 24 COLUtM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 9 (1990).
40. See id.
41. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61.
42. See id. at 67 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
43. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
44. See id. at 389.
45. Id. at 392.
46. See id. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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odicals from a sales tax was a violation of the Establishment
Clause.48 He again relied on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lynch, stating that when government directly subsidizes reli-
gious groups to the exclusion of other groups, "it 'provide[s]
unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' and
cannot but 'conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted
members of the community."49 Justice O'Connor joined Justice
Blackmun's concurrence but did not use the endorsement test.
They agreed that this was an Establishment Clause violation
because the exemption was limited to "the sale of religious
literature by a religious organization." °
Finally, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test was used in
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.5 Jus-
tice Blackmun announced the plurality opinion in which he re-
affirmed the Lemon test but only as it had been revised in Jus-
tice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch:
Since Lynch, the Court has made it clear that when evalu-
ating the effect of government conduct under the Establish-
ment Clause, we must ascertain whether "the challenged
governmental action is sufficiently likely to be perceived by
adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorse-
ment, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their
individual religious choices."52
Using this endorsement inquiry, the plurality found no violation
in a public display containing a Christmas tree, a Menorah,
and a sign that read "salute to liberty" but found that the pub-
lic display of a creche that contained a traditional nativity
scene was a violation of the Establishment Clause.' Although
she agreed with Justice Blackmun, Justice O'Connor again
wrote her own concurrence to clarify the endorsement analysis.'
48. See id. at 25.
49. Id. at 15 (1989) (quoting Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
50. Id. at 28.
51. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
52. Id. at 597 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390
(1985)).
53. See id. at 573.
54. See id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1999] 713
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Although many of the justices that originally adopted Justice
O'Connor's test have retired from the bench, the endorsement
test still enjoys some support from the current justices. While
they do not agree with every aspect of O'Connor's endorsement
test, both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter are likely to agree
with the use of the test in Establishment Clause cases.
B. Justice Stevens's Endorsement Test
Justice Stevens advocates the use of the endorsement test,
but his application of the test differs slightly from Justice
O'Connor's. Justice Stevens would still apply the Lemon test in
most instances. For the first prong of that test, however, he
would ask the slightly different question, "whether [the]
government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.""5 In Justice Stevens's view, the answer to this initial
inquiry may decide the issue without having to continue on to
the second prong: whether the government action in question
has the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion." A major
difference between Justice Stevens's and Justice O'Connor's
application of the endorsement test is Justice O'Connor's use of
the contextual inquiry in cases involving religious displays. For
example, in his concurring and dissenting opinion in County of
Allegheny v. ACLU,5" Justice Stevens opposed the use of con-
text as a decisive factor in Establishment Clause cases."
Under Justice O'Connor's endorsement analysis, the context
of the disputed symbol is normally important in determining
whether the message is one of endorsement. In contrast, Justice
Stevens would not focus on the context of the symbols but
would instead "create a strong presumption against the displays
of religious symbols on public property."59 This presumption
55. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
56. See generally Lewis & Vild, supra note 11, at 675-76 (discussing Justice
Stevens's majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, in which he concluded that the an-
swer to the first prong of Lemon precluded the need for further inquiry).
57. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
58. See generally Lewis & Vild, supra note 11, at 686 (discussing Justice
Stevens's preference for a presumption against religious symbols on public property,
rather than a subjective inquiry into the context of the display).
59. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 650.
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would allow certain displays, avoiding the hostility of an out-
right ban, yet would still "give[] due regard to religious and
nonreligious members of the society." ° Thus, Justice Stevens's
analysis, while different in its particulars, gives effect to the
main purpose of the endorsement test: adequate consideration
for the religious beliefs of minorities in society.
Justice Stevens's test as a whole has not yet made its way
into a majority opinion. Justice Stevens, however, wrote the
majority opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, the first majority opinion
to use endorsement language."' In that opinion, Justice
Stevens applied the Lemon test; however, he framed it in terms
of endorsement, asking whether the government intended to
"endorse or disapprove religion."62 He found that the statute
did in fact endorse religion and, therefore, violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.'
While Justice Stevens's idea of what constitutes endorsement
of religion varies slightly from that of Justice O'Connor, both
agree that endorsement is the proper concept to use in deter-
mining Establishment Clause violations. Their differing opinions
on how to apply the endorsement test has sometimes led to
discrepancies in their voting patterns, but it is likely that they
will continue to analyze Establishment Clause cases similarly,
using the endorsement test.
C. Justice Souter's Favoritism Test
Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1990, Justice Souter was
not on the bench when Lynch and the other cases that formu-
lated the endorsement test were decided; therefore, it is impos-
sible to determine how he would have voted on those particular
cases. Some of his recent opinions in Establishment Clause
cases, however, have shed light on his views. Justice Souter is
an advocate of the endorsement test introduced by Justice
O'Connor, but he makes a few modifications to her basic test.
60. Id. at 653.
61. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38.
62. Id. at 56 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
63. See id. at 60-61.
1999] 715
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
For Justice Souter, the basic test of the Establishment
Clause is whether the government "fail[s] to exercise .. au-
thority in a religiously neutral way" by "prefer[ring] one reli-
gion to another, or religion to irreligion."" Justice Souter
would apply the endorsement test, but rather than focusing on
endorsement or disapproval alone, he would go further and re-
quire complete neutrality by the government.' He presumes
that government officials, unless restrained by the courts, are
likely to "manipulate[]' the public forum" in such a way that
religious speech will be favored.6" This would allow the "gov-
ernment to encourage what it cannot do on its own."' Because
he requires government practices to be neutral between religion
and atheism, Justice Souter's test is more strict than Justice
O'Connor's.
In 1994, Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion in Board
of Education v. Grumet." In this case, Justice Souter struck
down a New York statute making the village of Kiryas Joel a
separate school district.69 He found that the creation of a sepa-
rate school district for the purpose of separating Satmars from
non-Satmars "aids a particular religious community" and is
therefore unconstitutional. °
In 1992, Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which
he stated that government sponsorship of religion violates the
Establishment Clause even if it does not favor one religion over
another.7 1 Justice Souter agreed with the majority that a grad-
uation ceremony prayer violated the Establishment Clause be-
cause it constituted a state sponsored religious exercise in a
public school.7 Justice Souter stated that "the state may not
favor or endorse either religion generally over nonreligion or
one religion over others .... This principle against favoritism
and endorsement has become the foundation of Establishment
64. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
65. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 627 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)
66. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 791 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 792 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
68. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
69. See id. at 709-10.
70. Id. at 708.
71. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 629 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 611 (Souter, J., concurring).
716 [Vol. 33:705
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Clause jurisprudence, ensuring that religious belief is irrelevant
to every citizen's standing in the political community.""
In his concurring opinion in Capitol Square Review and Advi-
sory Board v. Pinette, Justice Souter specifically recognized that
the Court should have applied the endorsement test and that
failure to do so created an exception that was "out of square
with our precedents." 4 He went on to say that he would apply
the endorsement test even if "precedent and practice were oth-
erwise. ' Finally, he acknowledged the danger that a reason-
able observer could mistake "private, unattended religious dis-
plays in a public forum for government speech endorsing reli-
gion, ' 76 an issue that the endorsement test addresses.
From these opinions, as well as others he has joined, it is
clear Justice Souter is likely to apply the endorsement test in
future Establishment Clause cases, although he would add his
own "neutrality" element to the test.
D. Justice Kennedy's Coercion Test
Like most of the current members of the Supreme Court,
Justice Kennedy no longer supports the Lemon test. However,
instead of substituting the endorsement test in Lemon's place,
Justice Kennedy advocates an entirely different test. Still oper-
ating within the original framework of Lemon, Justice
Kennedy's test focuses on government coercion in place of the
effects prong of Lemon.7 ' According to Justice Kennedy:
[G]overnment may not coerce anyone to support or partici-
pate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the
guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct
benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact "estab-
lishes a [state] religion or religious faith....
73. Id. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring).
74. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 784 (1995)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. at 791 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
76. Id. at 785 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
77. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
78. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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Without this element of coercion there is no Establishment
Clause violation. Justice Kennedy agrees with Justice Souter
that neutrality is the goal of the Establishment Clause; how-
ever, Justice Kennedy believes that this neutrality does not
require the government to "avoid all assistance to religion."79
Coercion, under Justice Kennedy's test, is not limited to di-
rect coercion; indirect or more subtle coercion can also violate
the Establishment Clause.' If the symbolic recognition of reli-
gion is passive, however, there is no violation.8' Noncoercive
government action within the realm of flexible accommodation
or passive acknowledgment of existing symbols does not violate
the Establishment Clause unless it benefits religion in a way
more direct and more substantial than practices that are ac-
cepted in our national heritage.""2
Justice Kennedy has criticized the use of the endorsement
test, saying that it does not follow prior Establishment Clause
precedent.' He believes that consistent use of Justice
O'Connor's test will strike down many of the nation's historical
and traditional practices. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy has
called it a "recent, and ... most unwelcome addition to our
tangled Establishment Clause jurisprudence."' Justice
Kennedy's coercion test would permit a state's endorsement of
religion, but would prohibit the state from furthering the inter-
ests of religion by using the government's coercive powers." As
a result, Justice Kennedy's test focuses not on the perceptions
of society but, instead, on the actual effects of a government
practice.8o
Justice Kennedy's concurring and dissenting opinion in Coun-
ty of Allegheny v. ACLU" and his majority opinion in Lee v.
79. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. See id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
81. See id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. Id. at 662-63 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. See Caress, supra note 17, at 480.
86. See id.
87. 492 U.S. 573, 655-79 (1989).
[Vol. 33:705718
ESTABLISHING A PATTERN
Weisman' exemplify his approach to the Establishment
Clause. In these cases, Justice Kennedy argues for the adoption
of a coercion standard in place of the endorsement test.
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy concurred with the majority's
holding that the menorah displayed outside a city building was
not a violation of the Establishment Clause, but he dissented
from the holding that a creche displayed on the grand staircase
of the courthouse was a violation. 9 Writing his own opinion,
Justice Kennedy urged that neither the Lemon test nor the
endorsement test should be used to analyze these cases. Rather,
the test should determine if the government action actually
coerced religious participation.' Justice Kennedy found no vio-
lation here because "[n]o one was compelled to observe or par-
ticipate in any religious ceremony or activity."
91
In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority
holding that the Providence school district's practice of inviting
members of the clergy to say prayers at middle school and high
school graduations was a violation of the Establishment
Clause.92 He explained his holding in terms of coercion, stating
that "prayer exercises in public schools carry a particular risk
of indirect coercion."93 "Finding no violation under these cir-
cumstances would place objectors in the dilemma of participat-
ing... or protesting."' Justice Kennedy then called attention
to psychological studies finding that teens are susceptible to
peer pressure and stated that government use of social pressure
was not acceptable. 95
Although Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, not a
single member of the Court expressly joined him. Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter all wrote or joined in
concurring opinions in which they distanced themselves from
his use of the coercion standard. The dissenters, Justices Scalia,
88. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
89. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 659-61 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
92. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 577.
93. Id. at 592.
94. Id. at 593.
95. See id. at 593-94.
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Rehnquist, Thomas, and White disagreed with Justice
Kennedy's use of psychological coercion and would have found
no violation.'
In Allegheny, Justice Kennedy obtained some support from
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and White. In his concurring/dis-
senting opinion, Justice Kennedy spoke of coercion but not of
the psychological kind. It seems that Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia are open to the use of a coercion standard as
long as it is applied narrowly and in a manner that is not
hostile to religion.9'
E. Justice Scalia's Tests: The Per Se Rule and Strict Coercion
As one of the most outspoken members of the Court, Justice
Scalia has frequently made his views about the Establishment
Clause known. Because his views tend to be somewhat extreme,
however, Justice Scalia has had little opportunity to write for
the majority. His dissents leave us with an idea of the standard
he would use to judge violations of the Establishment Clause,
and from these dissents one thing is certain: Justice Scalia is
among the members of the Court who would refuse to apply the
Lemon test. Justice Scalia stated:
Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedev-
iled ... by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not
derived from, but positively conflict with, our long accepted
constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been
the so-called Lemon test ... which has received well-earned
criticism from many Members of this Court.9"
Justice Scalia went on to celebrate what he interpreted as the
"interment" of the Lemon test.'
Justice Scalia's single plurality opinion involving the Estab-
lishment Clause was in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
96. See id. at 631-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-79 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98. Lee, 505 U.S. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
99. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Bd. v. Pinette.'0 In this case, Justice Scalia held that issuing
a permit to display a large Ku Klux Klan cross on a public fo-
rum next to the Ohio Statehouse did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause.'' In reaching this decision, Justice Scalia con-
structed a new standard for public forum Establishment Clause
cases.
Under Justice Scalia's "per se rule,"0 2 allowing a private
speaker access to a public forum for religious speech would
never violate the Establishment Clause, regardless of the ap-
pearance of endorsement to the public. He believes that "reli-
gious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where
it is (1) purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or desig-
nated public forum, publicly announced, and open to all on
equal terms."'0 3 This test would not allow for an examination
of the totality of the circumstances. Because there are no sub-
jective elements to this test, Justice Scalia believes it would
bring uniformity and predictability to the Court's decisions."°4
In Establishment Clause cases not involving private speech
in public fora, Justice Scalia would use a form of the Coercion
Test. According to his dissent in Lee v. Weisman, he would
apply the test much more strictly than Justice Kennedy.' 5
Justice Scalia believes that because prayer at public ceremonies
has been an American tradition for hundreds of years, "the Es-
tablishment Clause must be construed in light of the
'[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and
support for religion [that] are an accepted part of our political
and cultural heritage.'"' 0 6
More importantly, Justice Scalia would not extend the defini-
tion of coercion to include indirect pressure such as "'peer
100. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
101. See id. at 763-70.
102. See David Goldberger, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette:
Beware of Justice Scalia's Per Se Rule, 6 GEo. MASON L. REv. 1, 2 (1997).
103. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770.
104. See Goldberger, supra note 102, at 4, 31 (discussing Justice Scalia's rejection
of existing tests for Establishment Clause cases and his reasons for advocating the
adoption of a new standard).
105. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 640-44 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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pressure' coercion."'°7 "The coercion that was a hallmark of
historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious
orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of
penalty."°8 This was not the type of coercion present in Lee,
and Justice Scalia would not recognize a violation for anything
short of it.
F. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Although he has been on the Court since late 1971, the year
that Lemon was decided, there is surprisingly little evidence of
the standard the Chief Justice would use to decide Establish-
ment Clause cases. Like so many of the other justices, it is
clear that he would not use the Lemon test. Chief Justice
Rehnquist has severely criticized two of the three prongs of the
test, saying that the first prong, which looks for a secular pur-
pose, is useless because Congress could assert any purpose it
chooses to avoid a violation."9 Chief Justice Rehnquist finds
the entanglement prong even more objectionable because it
creates a "'Catch-22' ... whereby aid must be supervised to
ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself is held to
cause an entanglement.""0
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagrees with Jefferson's "wall of
separation." He believes that the Establishment Clause does not
require the government to be "strictly neutral between religion
and irreligion."lu  Consequently, Chief Justice Rehnquist
would not find a violation in cases where the government aids
religion in a nondiscriminatory way, as long as it is "pursuing
legitimate secular ends.""
While it is easy to discern which standards Chief Justice
Rehnquist would refuse to apply, it is not so simple to deter-
mine what test he would apply. The majority of his Establish-
ment Clause opinions have been dissents that he has either
107. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420-21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
111. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Written or joined. The few majority opinions he has authored
have applied the Lemon test or no test at all. It seems that,
generally, Chief Justice Rehnquist would allow a great deal of
government aid to religion as long as that aid is given in a
nondiscriminatory manner."' It is also likely that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist would agree with Justice Scalia on matters in-
volving coercion. He would not find a violation of the Establish-
ment Clause unless there had been direct coercion by the gov-
ernment."
14
G. The New Justices
Because they are so new to the Court, it is difficult to trace
and predict the voting patterns of Justices Thomas, Ginsburg,
and Breyer. There have been, however, a few recent cases that
give some indication of their Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence.
Although he has not yet written an opinion in an Establish-
ment Clause case, Justice Thomas has participated in a number
of these decisions. In 1992, Justice Thomas joined Justice
Scalia's dissent in Lee v. Weisman."5 The majority found a
violation, but Justice Thomas would have held that the state's
action in inviting a rabbi to say prayers at a graduation cere-
mony did not constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause." '6 In 1993, Justice Thomas joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion, holding there was no violation
when the state provided a sign-language interpreter for a stu-
dent attending a private religious school." ' In 1994, Justice
Thomas again joined Justice Scalia in dissent when the majori-
ty found a violation in New York's creation of a school district
in order to accommodate a religious group."' The dissenters
would have held that this was a "permissible accommodation"
of religion and, therefore, not a violation." 9 Finally, in 1997,
113. See id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 640-42 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. See id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3, 14 (1993).
118. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 732 (1994) (Scalla, J., dissent-
ing).
119. See id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Thomas joined the majority in holding that Title I aid
to students attending private religious schools did not violate
the Establishment Clause. 1
20
In each of the cases cited above, Justice Thomas has voted
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. More impor-
tantly, in each of these cases he has held with the side finding
no violation of the Establishment Clause.
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer were more recently ap-
pointed to the Court and have not participated in as many
decisions as Justice Thomas; therefore, it is more difficult to
characterize their views. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice
Stevens's concurrence in Grumet finding an Establishment
Clause violation and stating that by creating a segregated
school district, the state "provided official support to cement the
attachments of young adherents to a particular faith."2' Both
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined Justice Souter's dissent in
Agostini v. Felton in 1997.122 They would have found a viola-
tion in the use of Title I Federal Aid for the benefit of private
religious schools."2 Although there is very little evidence, it
appears that Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have tended to vote
in much the same way as Justices Souter and Stevens. Accord-
ingly, they are much more likely to find Establishment Clause
violations than Justice Thomas.
IV. CONCLUSION
It appears the Supreme Court has not progressed very far
from where it was in 1984 when the Lynch decision was an-
nounced. The Court was divided then, and it is equally divided
now. At one end of the spectrum, the Chief Justice, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas are unlikely to find a violation of
the Establishment Clause in any case absent direct government
coercion. Justice Kennedy is one step closer to the middle in
that he would find a violation where there is indirect coercion,
if the coercion is obvious and perhaps directed at school-aged
120. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
121. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 711 (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J., dissenting).
123. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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children. At the other end of the spectrum is Justice Souter,
who would find a violation in any case showing favoritism to a
particular religion or to religion generally. In his opinion, any-
thing short of complete neutrality is unacceptable. Justice
Stevens is also likely to find Establishment Clause violations
due to the presumption he would apply against the government
in the cases of religious displays on public property. Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer seem to fit somewhere toward this
side of the spectrum, although it is unclear exactly where they
stand.
This leaves Justice O'Connor in the middle, a place that has
become quite familiar to her. Justice O'Connor's application of
the endorsement test seems to be the only test currently ap-
plied that is not more likely to go one way than the other when
analyzing the Establishment Clause. As a result, Justice
O'Connor's vote will most likely remain the swing vote, and no
clear consensus will arise anytime soon among the members of
the Court.
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